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I. INTRODUCTION
Natural resource extraction in the form of livestock grazing, logging and
mining has shaped much of the history of the American West.' While min-
ing and timber industries have declined as a result of lower prices and re-
duced availability of resources on public lands, grazing has maintained its
place on the western frontier. As a result, three base uses currently exist for
open lands in the West: livestock production, habitat protection, and ex-
urban development.2 Although habitat protection and development can and
do bring controversy to the West, grazing is currently at the forefront of
public land debates.
Because much of the West is arid, ranchers rely on expansive amounts of
public rangeland to graze their cattle. Without federal and state grazing
leases, many ranchers would be unable to sustain their operations.4 Fur-
thermore, studies show ranchers with public land grazing leases obtain
higher net returns on their operations than those without leases.5 Because
public lands are a critical component to successful large scale ranching, the
availability of public lands will shape the future of the grazing industry.
Each year, the U.S. and state governments provide public land grazing
permits on federal and state land to more than 20,000 cattle ranchers. 6 Al-
though the number of federal permits is impressive, state grazing leases
comprise more than 90% of surface state land uses in 18 of the 22 states
with trust land.7 While the cost of these leases varies between states, they
* J.D. expected May of 2005 University of Montana School of Law. The author would like to
thank John Horwich and Andre Gurr for their help with this manuscript.
1. Jeremy D. Maestas, Richard L. Knight & Wendell C. Gilbert, Biodiversity and Land-Use
Change in the American Mountain West. 91 The Geographical Review 509, 510 (2001).
2. Id. at 510.
3. Martha J. Sullins et al. Lay of the Land: Ranch Land and Ranching, in Ranching West of the
10 0 h Meridian: Culture, Ecology, and Economics 25-26 (Richard L. Knight, Wendell C. Gilgert & Ed
Marston, eds., Island Press 2002).
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id.
6. L. Allen Torell et al., Presented Paper, Impacts of Grazing Policy on Grazing Practices and
Ranch Income (Salt Lake City, Utah, Aug. 2-5, 1998).
7. Jon A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, State Trust Lands: History, Management, and Sustainable
Use 101 (University Press of Kansas 1996).
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are relatively inexpensive, often costing ranchers less than two dollars per
animal unit month (the amount of forage one cow consumes in one month's
time).8
Recently, environmental groups and natural resource managers began
monitoring public land grazing trends as part of an effort to improve graz-
ing land quality. Some of these groups oppose all manner of public grazing,
and allege that public lands used for grazing are often poorly managed and
depleted in natural resources. 9 Others support a less hard-line approach, and
advocate better management of public lands and monitoring of lease users.
Although federal legislation such as the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA),' ° the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 11 and the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act (NEPA) 12 provides for the way these lands are managed, poor
monitoring can lead to destruction of wildlife habitat and range health.
13
Opponents of public land grazing promote a variety of methods to reform
the grazing industry. The most obvious solution, implementing better man-
agement and monitoring strategies, has had little success due to the costs
required to implement the strategies and monitor the results.' 4 Others use
scholarly publications in an attempt to convince legislators of the evils of
grazing.' 5 Yet another trend in grazing reform is the voluntary permit "buy-
out." Currently, Bills are before both the Arizona State Legislature and the
U.S. Congress that would allow the government to buyout permits from
grazers who wish to voluntarily relinquish their permits in exchange for
monetary compensation. Although this proposal is in theory a win/win
situation for all involved, there may be serious implications and conse-
quences if the government "buys" property it already owns.
16
A. Litigation as Grazing Reform
In addition to improved management, publications and permit buyout
programs, grazing opponents advocate numerous litigation strategies to
battle consumptive uses of public land. One such group, Forest Guardians,
routinely sues federal and state agencies in an attempt to force compliance
with the ESA, NEPA, and state legislation. 17 Forest Guardians' lawsuits
allege a multitude of public land wrongdoings, from agency and individual
8. Id.
9. See e.g. Debra L. Donahue, The Western Range Revisited: Removing Livestock from Public
Lands to Conserve Native Biodiversity 118 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).
10. 43 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347 (1969).
13. Debra L. Donahue, supra n. 9, at 118.
14. Id. at 138.
15. See e.g. Debra L. Donahue, supra n. 9.
16. While this issue presents an interesting topic for analysis, it is beyond the scope of this article.
17. See generally Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 2001 WL 1708775 (D.N.M. Aug. 9,
2001); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D.N.M. 2001); Forest Guardi-
ans v. Babbit, 174 F.3d 1178 (D.N.M. 1999).
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permit holder non-compliance, to flawed U.S.D.A. Forest Service (USFS)
and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) policies.18 For example, Forest
Guardians and other environmental groups recently sued USFS for failing
to reform the federal land grazing fee because the agency knew the mathe-
matical formula used to calculate the fee was flawed.' 9
Forest Guardians claims their lawsuits have "stopped dozens of timber
sales, protected ancient forests, eliminated livestock grazing from hundreds
of river miles and provided first-time instream flows to the over-
appropriated Rio Grande. ''20 While Forest Guardians alleges their court-
room tactics have improved wildlife and range health, it would ultimately
like to see an end to public land grazing.21 Toward that end, Forest Guardi-
ans obtain grazing permits on public state land and leave the land fallow to
restore ecosystem health. Although the TGA requires that federal grazing
22lands be used solely for grazing, some states allow conservation uses on
state-owned grazing lands.23 As a result, Forest Guardians currently holds
four separate grazing leases-three in New Mexico and one in Arizona.24
The road to obtaining grazing leases has not been easy. When Forest
Guardians' bids are rejected by state departments, it brings suit, alleging the
respective department violated its fiduciary duty to the state schools by
rejecting bids that are substantially higher than those offered by grazers.25
Forest Guardians is thus dependent on the state judiciary to validate its alle-
gations and allow it to outbid public land grazers for state trust land. Re-
cently, in a challenge that went to the Arizona Supreme Court, Forest
Guardians were successful in such a pursuit.26 The Arizona Supreme Court
held the state must consider all bids on state trust land leases even if the
applicants have no intention of using the land in accordance with the its
identified use.27 The implications of such a court holding are immense-
any person or organization who wishes to control state land for any reason
can potentially do so. In addition, Forest Guardians have potentially created
a new method for eliminating grazing on state lands.
18. Forest Guardians, Your Public Lands: Grazed to the Bone <http://www.fguardians.
org/graz.html> (accessed March 14, 2003).
19. Environmental Coalition Sues U.S. Forest Service over Grazing Fees, 122 Frontline 2 (Mar.
13, 2003). Note: Frontline is the newsletter of the Forest Guardians.
20. John C. Homing & Doyne Farmer, Thirteen Years of Uncompromising Advocacy, True to Our
Nature - Forest Guardians Annual Report 2-3 (2001) (available at <http://www.fguardians.org/re-
ports/fg2001-annualreport.pdf>).
21. Id.
22. 43 U.S.C. § 315(a).
23. Forest Guardians has grazing leases on New Mexico state lands. Petition for Review at 3,
Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d 364 (2001).
24. Personal communication, John Homing, Director, Forest Guardians (October 2003).
25. See e.g. Forest Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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B. Purpose and Scope
In this paper, I argue the Arizona Supreme Court erroneously decided the
Forest Guardians case and provide some insight into the potential draw-
backs accompanying the decision. The strategies used by the Forest
Guardians and other environmental groups in obtaining grazing leases are
often inconsistent with state and federal law. Paramount to the Forest
Guardians' litigation strategy is the state's fiduciary duty regarding the
management of state trust lands. However, the definition of "highest and
best" bid is not necessarily the bid offering the most amount of money. Al-
though what is "best" for a trust often appears to be the highest immediate
financial gain, ignoring long-term effects of leasing to the highest bidder
could be costly.
Although this paper is specific to Arizona laws and policies, it has a
broader relevance. The grazing industry is currently facing substantial
changes, and court decisions will play a major role in shaping its future. In
an attempt to influence the grazing industry, many environmental organiza-
tions are moving to legislation and advocating for broad interpretations of
grazing statutes in order to lease grazing lands and/or buy out permit hold-
ers. Although the federal government and most state governments have
refused to lease public land for uses other than those originally intended,
environmental organizations will likely challenge the grazing policies of
other states. Arizona's laws have influenced the management of state trust
lands in other states for decades.28 If Arizona's recent decision regarding
state trust lands is adopted, it will likely effect public land use, the grazing
industry and the lifestyle and ecological health of the West.
This paper is divided into five major sections. The next section discusses
the history and origin of Arizona's school trust lands and describes some of
the overarching rules that apply to these lands. Section three fully details
Arizona's duties in managing its school trust lands and overviews the laws
and cases that have helped shape the current management scheme. Section
four uses the Forest Guardians case as a microcosm for looking into the
manner in which states lease their school trust lands. Finally, section five
argues the Arizona Supreme Court decided the Forest Guardians case erro-
neously. It also summarizes the major points, discusses long range financial
impacts in managing school trust lands and provides an outlook on the fu-
ture of public lands grazing.
28. See generally Souder & Fairfax, supra, n. 7.
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II. STATE TRUST LANDS
A. History of the State Trust Land Program
The General Land Ordinance of 1785 was the first piece of legislation
that allocated federal land grants to states in the western territories. 29 The
act, which authorized the sale and survey of western lands, declared that
section number 16 in every township would be preserved for the township
and held in trust for the state schools. 30 Two years later, Congress passed
the Northwest Ordinance, which was designed to be a guideline for territo-
ries aspiring to enter the Union. 31 The Northwest Ordinance required a terri-
tory desiring statehood to petition for admittance to the Union once its
population reached 60,000 and authorized Congress to pass an enabling act
that would allow the territory to create a constitution.32 After the constitu-
tion was drafted, it had to be approved by both the territory and Congress.
At that point, the new state would become an equal part of the Union.33
Between 1785 and 1803, none of the 15 states that entered the Union re-
ceived state trust lands upon admittance.34 In 1803, Ohio became the first
state to receive trust lands in accordance with the General Land Ordinance
of 1785. 33 Over the next 100 years, the majority of the Union's current
states entered the Union and received trust lands in accordance with each
state's enabling act and the circumstances surrounding its path to statehood.
As a result of differing legislation and a state's previous status, only 29 of
the 50 states received state trust lands upon accession. 36 For example, Texas
entered the Nation as a former independent republic and thus had no federal
lands for conveyance to the state.37
B. Management of State Trust Lands
State trust lands are lands owned by a state and are to be held in trust for
that state's schools.38 Although early enabling acts did not refer to trust
principles, each of the 22 states with state trust lands currently manages its
lands as if held in trust for the state schools. 39 However, this was not always
the case. Trust principles relating to state trust lands did not clearly arise
29. Id. at 18.
30. Land Ordinance of 1785.
31. Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7, at 18.
32. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 5.
33. Id.
34. Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7, at 19.
35. Id. at 22
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform: Learning
from Four State Cases, 33 Envtl. L. 341, 347 (Spring 2003).
39. Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7, at 33.
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until 1967,4° when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lassen v. Arizona ex
rel. Arizona Highway Department.4' Lassen involved an appeal in which
the Arizona Supreme Court held the state land Commissioner had no au-
thority to adopt a rule that required the state highway department to com-
pensate the state land department for rights of way over and on trust lands.
The Supreme Court reversed, maintaining the Arizona-New Mexico Ena-
bling Act of 1910 (Enabling Act) "unequivocally demands both that the
trust receive the full value of any lands transferred from it and that any
funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land was
given.,,42 This holding quickly radiated to all of the western states because
the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act provides the most definitive illus-
trations on the management of state trust lands.43 As a result, Arizona's
management of its trust lands is a strong indication of the method by which
other states manage their trust lands.
C. Trust Principles Relating to the State trust Lands
Under Lassen, state trust lands must be managed in accordance with trust
principles. Thus, it is necessary to provide a brief insight into those princi-
ples. A trust is a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting
the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to
deal with the property for the benefit of another person."" The trustee holds
the property in trust for the beneficiary, the entity or person who benefits
from the property.45 The relationship between the trustee and the benefici-
ary is fiduciary. The trustee has a duty to "act with strict honesty and can-
dor and solely in the interest of the beneficiary. 46 Following these princi-
ples, the state of Arizona instructs the State Land Department (Department),
acting through the Land Commissioner (Commissioner), to manage, lease,
and sell state trust lands in the best interest of the state's schools.47 The next
section provides further insight into how Arizona manages its state trust
lands.
40. Id.
41. 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
42. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 466.
43. Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7, at 34-35.
44. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959).
45. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 3.
46. G.T. Bogert, Trusts (1987), 1-2.
47. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-102, 37-132 (2001).
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II. HISTORY OF ARIZONA TRUST LAND LAW
A. Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act and the Arizona Constitution
The Enabling Act authorized New Mexico and Arizona to develop state
constitutions and assured statehood for the two territories. 48 This legislation
also granted to the state of Arizona almost 10 million acres of land to be
held in trust for the state's schools.49 Section 24 of the Enabling Act granted
sections 16, 36, 2 and 32 in every township to the state of Arizona "for the
support of the common schools. '50 Although only one or two sections in
each township were historically granted to new states, Arizona and New
Mexico received four sections in each township, providing the two states
with more state trust land acres than any other state in the Union.51 Two
52years later, in 1912, Arizona became a state.
In addition to granting land to the states, the Enabling Act required the
lands be held in trust by the state.53 The Enabling Act also mandated that
state trust lands be sold or leased to the "highest and best bidder" and for
grazing, agricultural, commercial, and homesite purposes. 54 Thus, the fed-
eral legislation enacted in relation to Arizona's ascension to statehood pro-
vided mandatory guidelines for the state to follow in regard to managing its
state trust lands. As a result, any violation of these guidelines should consti-
tute a federal question for the courts.
If inconsistent with Arizona's Constitution on the subject of granted
lands, Arizona courts have consistently found the Enabling Act to be the
supreme law of the State of Arizona.55 As Arizona's Constitution states:
The state of Arizona and its people hereby consent to all
and singular the provisions of the enabling act approved
June 20, 1910, concerning the lands thereby granted or
confirmed to the state, the terms and conditions upon which
said grants and confirmations are made, and the means and
manner of enforcing such terms and conditions, all in every
respect and particular as in the aforesaid enabling act pro-
vided. 56
48. Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. 219 (c. 310), 36 Stat. 557, 568-579 (1910).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7, at 21.
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. 219 § 28
54. Pub. L. 219 § 28(1)
55. See e.g. Murphy v. State, 181 P.2d 336 (Ariz. 1947); Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 633 P.2d
325 (Ariz. 1981); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dept., 747 P.2d 1183 (Ariz. 1987).
56. Ariz. Const. art. 20 § 12; see also Murphy, 181 P.2d at 342.
2004]
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
Thus, without Congressional approval, the state of Arizona may not act
outside the provisions of the Enabling Act.57 As stated in Kadish v. Arizona
State Land Department, "[Congress] intended the Enabling Act to severely
circumscribe the power of state government to deal with the assets of the
common school trust. The duties imposed upon the state were the duties of
a trustee and not simply the duties of a good business manager.
' 58
Article 10 of the Arizona Constitution reads almost verbatim to the Ena-
bling Act and mandates that state lands be held in trust and managed in
accordance with the Enabling Act. 59 Any disposition of the state trust lands
in any manner contrary to the Enabling Act will be considered a breach of
trust under the constitution.60 The Constitution gives Arizona authority to
lease land under the same categories as the Enabling Act: grazing, agricul-
61tural, commercial, and homesite. It also requires the state to lease or sell
lands to the "highest and best bidder., 62 As such, the Arizona Constitution
and the Enabling Act are harmonious and it would seem few issues should
arise as to the management of Arizona state trust lands.
B. Arizona Statutory Law
To further clarify the goals of the Enabling Act and the Arizona Consti-
tution, the Arizona Legislature has implemented guidelines for how the
state should manage its state trust lands. In Arizona, state land is "any land
owned or held in trust, or otherwise, by the state, including leased school or
university land. 63 As mentioned, the Department, through the guidance of
the Commissioner and monitored by the governor, is charged with the task
of administering trust lands for the state. 64 The statutes divide the leaseable
trust lands into four classifications: agricultural, grazing, homesite, and
commercial.65 No other categories are allowed. Grazing lands are defined as
"lands which can be used only for the ranging of livestock.,
66
The Commissioner may not lease state trust lands for any purpose other
than the land's designation, and "no lessee shall use lands leased to him
except for the purpose for which the lands are leased. 67 However, the
Commissioner is permitted to "authorize non-use for part or all of the graz-
ing use upon request of the lessee at least sixty days prior to the beginning
of the billing date. 68 While the scope of this section remains unclear, the
57. Ariz. Const. art. 20 § 12; Murphy, 181 P.2d at 345.
58. Kadish, 747 P.2d at 1186.
59. Ariz. Const. art. 10.
60. Id. at § 2.
61. Id. at § 3(1).
62. Id. at § 3.
63. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-101(17).
64. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-102, 37-132.
65. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-281(A).
66. Aiz. Rev. Stat. § 37-101(7).
67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-281(D).
68. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-285(H).
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Commissioner is required to "withdraw state land from surface or subsur-
face sales or lease applications if the Commissioner deems it to be in the
best interest of the trust. '69 In addition, the Commissioner has the authority
to designate trust land suitable for conservation purposes in specific areas
of the state.7 0 Accordingly, the Commissioner is responsible for the health
of state trust land and must ensure it remains a viable commodity for the
state trust in the future.
C. Arizona Case Law
The Arizona Supreme Court has had some opportunity to discuss the
state's fiduciary duty in managing its state trust lands.7 1 Although Arizona's
statutory and case law is clear regarding land classifications and the Com-
missioner's duties, it is less clear on two issues: whether the Enabling Act
or the Arizona Constitution is the controlling authority for state trust land
conflicts, and the meaning of "best" in terms of bids for state trust lands.
1. Interpretation of the Enabling Act
In resolving state trust land conflicts, two important Arizona cases
looked to the Enabling Act for controlling authority instead of the Arizona
Constitution. In Kadish, the court held the restrictions placed on the De-
partment are in place to ensure the state trust is managed in the best manner
possible, and concluded that Congress intended the Enabling Act to go be-
yond the power of the state government.72 Kadish involved a suit brought
by taxpayers to challenge the Department's decision to lease minerals on
state trust lands at a flat rate lower than the appraised value of the leases7 3
The court held the Department violated the state's Enabling Act and Consti-
tution, and that Congress "intended the Enabling Act to severely circum-
scribe the power of state government to deal with the assets of the common
state trust. The duties imposed upon the state were the duties of a trustee
and not simply the duties of a good business manager."74 Thus, Kadish set a
standard for the leasing of state trust lands and expressly placed the fiduci-
ary duty foremost in accepting lease applications.
A second landmark case that looked to the Enabling Act for guidance in
resolving a conflict concerning the sale of state trust lands was Gladden
Farms, Inc. v. Arizona, which dealt with a corporation's desire to void a
sale of state trust lands because the Department did not sell the land at pub-
69. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-132(A)(11).
70. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-312(A).
71. See generally Kadish, 747 P.2d 1183; Jeffries v. Hassell, 3 P.3d 1071 (Ariz. 1999); Havasu
Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prod., Inc., 807 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. 1990); Ariz,
Highway Dept., 407 P.2d 747.
72. 747P.2dat 1185.
73. 747P.2dat 1184-1185.
74. 747 P.2d at 1186.
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lic auction.75 There, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly held that the
Enabling Act is "superior to the Constitution of the State of Arizona" and
cannot be changed without an act of Congress. 76 The court concluded that
because the Department did not sell the land at public auction, as the statute
provided, its fiduciary duty to the school had been violated. 77 "We do not
believe that the sale without auction and bid assures the 'highest and best'
price that the Enabling Act requires. '78 Thus, the Enabling Act's place in
Arizona law was confirmed.
The only case in which the Supreme Court looks to the Arizona Constitu-
tion as controlling authority over the Enabling Act is when the Enabling
Act is found to be ambiguous or silent on an issue.79 In Deer Valley, the
Arizona Supreme Court found the controlling authority to be the Arizona
Constitution because the Court did not agree with the construction of the
Enabling Act in Lassen.80 Although Lassen interpreted the Enabling Act to
mean condemnation was an acceptable way to dispose of state trust lands,
the court in Deer Valley looked to almost identical language in the Arizona
Constitution and held the state did not allow it.81 While Deer Valley seems
to support the proposition that the Arizona Constitution controls trust land
issues, it is important to remember that only when there is a disagreement
as to interpretation should the Arizona Constitution control, and even then,
the Constitution should be read in conjunction with the Enabling Act.82
2. Definition of the "Best" bid
Two other cases attempt to define the meaning of "highest and best" in
relation to the trustee's fiduciary duty. As mentioned, the Enabling Act, the
Arizona Constitution, and state statutory law require trust lands to be leased
to the "highest and best" bidder. Although the meaning of "highest" in this
context is clear, there has been much debate over the meaning of "best." In
Jeffries v. Hassell, taxpayers brought suit against the state alleging the De-
partment violated its fiduciary duty when it failed to maximize revenue
from the state's trust grazing lands. 83 The court concluded that summary
judgment for the taxpayers was improper, and defined the "highest and
best" requirement for acceptance of lease bids. While "highest" bid is sim-
ply the bid that promises the most money, what is the "best" bid presents a
question of law and fact. The court maintained the Commissioner has con-
75. 633 P.2d 325, 327 (Ariz. 1981).
76. Id. at 327.
77. Id. at 330.
78. Id.
79. See Deer Valley Unified School Dist. No. 97 of Maricopa Co. v. Superior Ct. of the state of
Ariz., in and for the Co. of Maricopa, 760 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 1988).
80. Id. at 541.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 3 P.3d at 1074.
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siderable discretion in determining the "best" bid,84 but failed to elaborate
further or provide guidelines for the Commissioner.
In Havasu Heights Ranch & Development v. Desert Valley Wood Prod-
ucts, the plaintiff argued the Department violated its fiduciary duty when it
rejected the plaintiff s bid for lease renewal because the Department did not
have a replacement lessee, and thus, would not earn any money off the land.
85 Although the court agreed the Department "has a duty to maximize the
financial benefits flowing from the trust, [it concluded] the 'best interest'
standard does not require blind adherence. 86 The issue in Havasu Heights
was whether "the sole or predominant interest of the state is the maximiza-
tion of lease revenue. 87 The court concluded:
Lease revenue is not the sole factor which governs the de-
partment's decision. The Legislature chose a broader, "best
interest" standard that permits other considerations, such as
the public benefits flowing from employing state land in
88
uses of higher value than would the applicant for a lease.
In so holding, the court indicated that long term concerns regarding the use
of land are "legitimate considerations" in denying an otherwise "best" bid. 89
Although the Enabling Act and the Arizona Constitution arguably pro-
vide the most unambiguous guidelines of all the states' enabling acts and
constitutions, 90 Arizona has seen a handful of cases regarding the manage-
ment of the state's state trust lands. Two common themes arise from these
cases: (1) The Enabling Act is a definitive resource for state trust land man-
agement questions, and (2) "Highest and best" can be satisfied in ways
other than accepting the bid that offers the highest financial gain.
IV. FOREST GUARDIANS V. WELLS
Prior to 2001, Arizona did not allow grazing lands to be used for conser-
vation purposes. In Forest Guardians, the Forest Guardians sought to ac-
quire a grazing lease on state trust land in order to restore the land's health.
In a landmark decision, the Arizona Supreme Court held the state was re-
quired to consider all bids, regardless of proposed use, and accept only
those bids in the best interest of the state trust.91 This case sets a precedent
for the state of Arizona, and allows conservationists and hunters to apply
for grazing permits. Although the ruling is unique only to a few jurisdic-
84. Id.
85. 807 P.2d at 1127.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1128.
89. Id.
90. See generally Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7.
91. Id. at 373.
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tions, it could be an indication of the future of state-run public lands graz-
ing, and seriously undermines the ability of ranchers to earn a living. While
the short-term financial gains of leasing to the highest bidder are clear, the
indirect, long-term implications of allowing conservationists to bid on graz-
ing permits could be costly. An unstable grazing market could cause some
ranchers to go out of business without suitable grazing land to lease. If pub-
lic land grazers no longer use public grazing lands, there will be no need for
environmental organizations to bid on grazing lands, as the land will al-
ready be in non-use. This phenomenon could cost Arizona and similar
states millions in fees for the schools, because there will be substantially
fewer potential lessees. This section details the facts of the Forest Guardi-
ans case, the court's decision, and the dissenting opinion. The next section
resolves issues presented by the case and argues the Arizona Supreme
Court incorrectly decided this it.
A. Facts
Plaintiffs in this case are the Forest Guardians, a New Mexico organiza-
tion that "seeks to protect and restore southwest streams, rivers, and wet-
lands that have been damaged by the grazing of livestock," and Jonathan
Tate, a concerned citizen and Western Gamebird Alliance member (collec-
tively Plaintiffs).92 In 1995, Forest Guardians began bidding on and receiv-
ing grazing leases in the state of New Mexico, with the purpose of resting
the land and improving it as wildlife habitat. 93 In 1997, Plaintiffs bid on
grazing leases in Arizona with the hopes of continuing their mission in an-
other state. After the Commissioner, David Wells, and the Department re-
jected their bids because Plaintiffs did not intend to graze livestock on the
lands, Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner and the Department, arguing their
refusal to consider Plaintiffs' bids was contrary to the Arizona Constitution
and the state's Enabling Act.94
In 1997, Forest Guardians applied for two state trust land grazing leases.
The first lease was located in Coconino County and consisted of 5,000
acres. Forest Guardians offered to pay nearly twice as much for the Cocon-
ino lease as the then-current lessee offered to pay for a renewal. Forest
Guardians' second bid was for a 162-acre grazing lease in Santa Cruz
County. For this lease, Forest Guardians offered five times the previous
lessee's bid. In both lease applications, Forest Guardians noted they would
not use the land for grazing cattle; instead, they would rest the property for
the duration of the ten-year lease.95
92. Appellants' Opening Br. at 3, Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d 364 (2001).
93. Ollie Reed, Jr., Environment Group Secures Grazing Lease, The Albuquerque Tribune (Octo-
ber 5, 2002).
94. Petition for Review at 8, Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d 364 (2001).
95. Forest Guardians, 334 P.3d at 366.
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The same year, Jonathan Tate applied for a 15,000 acre lease in Pinal
County, offering to pay twice the amount offered by the previous lessee. As
in the Forest Guardians' applications, Tate notified the Commissioner he
would not graze the land. Forest Guardians and Tate asked the Commis-
sioner to allow the land to be used "for purposes other than domestic live-
stock grazing." Both applicants argued the leases were in the best interest of
the trust because they allowed the land to rest and provided the highest fi-
nancial gain for the state trust.
9 6
The Department refused to consider Plaintiffs' applications, stating that
in order to have their bids considered by the Department, they would have
to apply for a reclassification of the land from grazing to commercial use.
Plaintiffs chose not to retract their bids or have the land reclassified as they
would be forced to pay a higher lease rate.
B. Procedural History
After the Department rejected Plaintiffs' bids, Plaintiffs appealed the de-
cision to an administrative law judge (ALR), arguing the Department had a
duty to accept bids that were in the best interest of the state schools. The
ALR found the Department did not breach its duty to the state schools when
it denied Plaintiffs' bids, and the Department reinstated its opinion.97
Plaintiffs' appeals to the trial court and then the court of appeals were
unsuccessful. Both courts affirmed the Department's decision, and the court
of appeals held that state trust land was required by law to be used in the
manner for which it was classified, and without reclassification, conserva-
tion uses were not permitted on grazing lands.98 The majority relied on the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Public Lands Council v. Babbite9
and concluded that Arizona statutes prohibited awarding grazing leases for
the purpose of restoration. 1°° Further, the court of appeals found Plaintiffs'
bids were not in the best interest of the state trust, so the Department was
not required to consider them.' 01
C. Court's Reasoning
In Forest Guardians, the Arizona Supreme Court overturned the lower
courts' decisions and held the Department must consider the Forest Guardi-
ans' bids and issue leases based upon its fiduciary duties to the state trust. It
held that grazing permits could be issued to groups with no intention of
using the land for livestock if it was in the best interest of the state trust,
96. Id.
97. Id. at 367.
98. Forest Guardians v. Wells, 197 Ariz. 511, 516 (App. 2000) (rev'd) [Hereinafter Forest Guardi-
ans I].
99. 154 F.3d 1160 (10"h Cir. 1998) [Hereinafter Public Lands Council 1].
100. Forest Guardians 1, 197 Ariz. at 517.
101. Id. at 518.
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and the Department breached its duty to the state trust when it refused to
consider Plaintiffs' bids.10 2 The court reasoned that if livestock-owning
permit holders could apply for a non-use permit of grazing land, so could a
conservation group. 1
03
The court reached two main conclusions as to why Forest Guardians
have the right to obtain grazing leases absent an intention to graze. First, the
Enabling Act instituted the state trust land and requires the lands be leased
to the "highest and best" bidder of public land. 1°4 The Arizona Constitution
incorporates the Enabling Act, and thus it applies to state trust land grazing
leases. In this case, the court decided the constitutional issues using solely
the Arizona Constitution, arguing the fiduciary duty imposed in the state's
Constitution is more stringent than the one imposed by the Enabling Act.
The court cited Kadish, arguing that requiring the Department to accept the
"highest and best" bids "prevent[s] dissipation of the trust assets."'10 5 The
court also looked to the meaning of trustee, and determined "the Commis-
sioner is subject to the same fiduciary obligations as any private trustee.' 1°6
The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and ruled that "a trustee
of land is normally under a duty to lease it or manage it so that it will pro-
duce income."'
10 7
The court's second justification concerned the classification of state trust
land. Grazing land "can be used only for the ranging of animals," and
commercial land "can be used primarily for business, institutional, reli-
gious, charitable, governmental or recreational purposes, or any general
purpose other than agricultural, grazing, mining, oil, homesite or rights-of-
way. 408 State trust lands are classified based on their highest and best use.
Commercial use is a higher category than grazing use, the lowest category.
The court rebutted the Department's argument that Plaintiffs should apply
for reclassification of the land by suggesting that commercial lands have a
higher rental rate,'09 thus potentially discouraging prospective conservation-
ists. ° The court reasoned the Arizona Constitution and the Commis-
sioner's fiduciary duties as trustee overpower the Department's argument
that Plaintiffs should have to apply for reclassification. Plaintiffs did not
wish to have the land reclassified as commercial, which can run up to 99
years, while grazing leases run up to 10 years. Plaintiffs sought to obtain
10-year leases that would remain in the grazing classification. The court
found "nothing in the definition of commercial land to suggest that it per-
102. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 372-373.
103. Id. at 372.
104. Ariz. Const. art 10 § 8.
105. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 369.
106. Id.
107. § 176, cmt. a(1959).
108. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-107(1).
109. Id. at § 37-281.02.
110. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 369.
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mits the type of non-use Plaintiffs propose.""' The court said the non-use
proposed by Plaintiffs "does not really conflict with grazing use." 12 Be-
cause the Department has the authority to provide lease owners with a non-
use status for all or part of their grazing area, 1 3 and the Department has
awarded non-use permits to grazing lessees, the court concluded non-use
permits should be considered even if the potential lessee has no intention of
grazing any time during the duration of the lease. 1 4 Finally, the court speci-
fied that grazing land is identified as such simply because it has no other
practical use. They reasoned Plaintiffs should not have to apply for reclassi-
fication because the Department already allows partial non-use permits, and
a commercial classification would drive potential bidders away due to
higher costs.' 5
In summary, the court maintained the Arizona Constitution does not re-
quire property classification; just that the "highest and best bidder" is
awarded the lease. 1 6 The court concluded property classification is simply
an option to aid in the management of trust lands. The court focused on the
Commissioner's fiduciary duty, and determined this case turned only on
whether the Department breached its fiduciary duty to the trust. Because
that duty required the Commissioner to consider all bids in order to cor-
rectly determine whether they were in the best interest of the trust, the De-
partment violated its fiduciary duty to the state schools."17
D. Dissent
Only Justice Martone dissented, maintaining the majority construed the
issue too narrowly by limiting it to the Department's fiduciary duty. Unlike
the majority, which based its decision solely on the Arizona Constitution,
the dissent looks to the Enabling Act, which is "superior to the Constitution
of the state of Arizona."' 8 The dissent reasoned that the issue of breech of
fiduciary duty is a federal question. Justice Martone opined the majority's
"express refusal to rest its decision on the Enabling Act is both an admis-
sion that the Act does not support its position, and an attempt to avoid fur-
ther federal judicial review."'' 9
The dissent focused on land classification and found the Enabling Act
expressly creates land classifications, including grazing, and authorizes the
legislature to grant leases in accordance with those classifications. When
the legislature incorporated the Enabling Act in the Arizona Constitution,
111. Id. at 370.
112. Id.
113. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-285(H).
114. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 370.
115. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 370-37 1.
116. Ariz. Const. art 10 § 8.
117. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 371.
118. Gladden Farms, Inc., 633 P.2d at 327.
119. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 373 (Martone, J., dissenting).
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the "highest and best bidder" language and the land classification system
were incorporated into Arizona law. 120 Thus, the legislature requires the
Commissioner to classify the state trust lands and lease those lands accord-
ing to their classification.' 2 1 "Without classification of best use," the dissent
argued, "state lands would always go to the highest bidder, the lands would
be dissipated, and Arizona would have no public lands."'
' 22
Next, the dissent turned to non-use of state grazing lands. Arizona law
requires "the Commissioner shall... [w]ithdraw state land from surface or
subsurface sales or lease applications if the Commissioner deems it to be in
the best interest of the trust.' ' 123 While the majority suggested the Commis-
sioner could withdraw lands from leasing when it is in the best interest of
the trust, 124 the legislature expressly requires it.125 The dissent concluded if
the lands were overgrazed and needed rest, the Commissioner breached his
fiduciary duty when he did not withdraw the lands from the lease pool. The
dissent suggested Plaintiffs' solution could be to ask the Commissioner to
withdraw the lands, and if he refused, Plaintiffs' could seek judicial review
of the decision, thus avoiding the classification system, which requires that
"leasee[s] shall use lands leased to him... for the purpose for which the
lands are leased."'
126
The dissent also detailed the Grazing Land Valuation Commission,
which is charged with appraising the value of grazing lands and includes a
university professor, a professional appraiser, and a conservationist. 127 In
appraising all grazing lands, the Commissioner must consider land health
and carrying capacity, and can reclassify or reappraise the land if needed.
Although the Department "may authorize non-use for part or all of the graz-
ing lease upon request of the leasee at least 60 days prior to the start of the
billing date,' ' 12 the dissent construed this to mean only land originally
leased for grazing purposes can be placed in the non-use category. Bidders
with no intention to graze or use the land should not be considered as non-
use because to do so would be inconsistent with the duties of the Grazing
Land Valuation Commission and the Department.
129
In summary, the dissent reasoned it is the Commissioner's responsibility
to withdraw lands from the lease pool if they are in need of rest. It failed to
clearly address and reconcile the "highest and best" language on which the
majority relied. Instead, Justice Martone argued this case should have been
120. Ariz. Const. art. 10 § 3.
121. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-212 (1993).
122. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 374 (Martone, J., dissenting).
123. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-132(A)(11).
124. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 372.
125. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 374 (Martone, J., dissenting).
126. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-281(D).
127. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-285(C).
128. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-285(H).
129. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 375 (Martone, J., dissenting).
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decided using the Enabling Act and the land classification system. In addi-
tion, the dissent argued that although third parties can nominate lands for
removal from the leasing pool, they should not determine whether non-use
is required. Justice Martone believed "difficult cases sometimes create bad
law... this is one of them. It is hard to predict the consequences that might
flow from the majority's ruling that requires the Commissioner to consider
the highest bid even when the property is not going to be used for the pur-
pose for which the lease is intended."
1 30
V. DISCUSSION
A. Resolving Forest Guardians
Based on the above information, it would seem the court was forced to
decide Forest Guardians for Plaintiffs, using the fiduciary duty, or for the
Department, using the classification system. This section will demonstrate
these concepts are not incongruous, and the court should have found for the
Department using both the classification system and the fiduciary duty.
While the majority incorrectly construed the state's statutory and case law,
both the majority and the dissent failed to consider long-term financial re-
turns.
1. Proving the Majority Wrong
The majority in Forest Guardians made four major mistakes in its analy-
sis. First, it decided the case using the state Constitution, despite earlier
case law holding the Enabling Act is "superior to the Constitution of the
State of Arizona"' 3' and should be considered in accordance with the state
Constitution in resolving state trust land disputes.132 As Justice Martone
indicated, using the Arizona Constitution instead of the Enabling Act was
simply an attempt to avoid further judicial scrutiny. 133 Had the court looked
to the Enabling Act as controlling, this case could have gone to the U.S.
Supreme Court on appeal. There, the Court would likely have looked to the
unambiguous language of the Enabling Act and found it did not allow the
issuance of grazing permits absent intent to graze, just as the 10th Circuit
did in Public Lands Council.134 Although the U.S. Supreme Court was not
asked to decide the issue when it considered Public Lands Council on ap-
peal, it provided dicta on the subject, stating, "the regulations do not allow
[conservation use]. The regulations specify that regular grazing permits will
be issued for livestock grazing or suspended use."' 135 While the statutes at
130. Id.
131. Gladden Farms, Inc., 633 P.2d at 327.
132. See Kadish, 747 P.2d 1183; Gladden Farms, Inc., 633 P.2d 325.
133. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 373 (Martone, J., dissenting).
134. 167 F.3d 1287, 1307-1308 (1999).
135. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 747 (2000).
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issue were different than the statutes at issue in Forest Guardians, the fed-
eral courts have demonstrated a trend of following the clear and unambigu-
ous language of the statute.
Second, the court completely disregarded the state trust land classifica-
tion system and, without justification, held there is "nothing in the defini-
tion of commercial land to suggest that it permits the type of non-use Plain-
tiffs propose." 136 In fact, while the definition of commercial includes "any
general purpose" in its statutory definition, the statutory definition of graz-
ing includes no general purpose element. 37 It simply requires that the land
is used for "the ranging of animals."'' 38 As a result, non-use would be con-
sistent with a commercial classification, and completely inconsistent with a
grazing classification, unless accompanied by some form of grazing.
Third, the majority omitted relevant statutes in making its decision, and
maintained the Department could withdraw lands from the lease pool at its
discretion. 139 However, the legislature expressly requires the Commissioner
to remove lands from the leasing pool if it is in the best interest of the
trust.140 If the lands were in such bad repair as to require complete non-use,
removing the lands from the leasing pool would have been in the best inter-
est of the trust and the duty of the Commissioner. The majority's assertion
that providing the lease to an organization or person that would not use the
land would benefit the trust financially and ecologically is not compelling.
Nothing in the Enabling Act or the state's statutory language allows the
court to arbitrarily allow public citizens to do the Commissioner's job. If
the land needed to be rested, the Commissioner should have been required
to remove it from the lease pool. Fourth, while the majority is correct that
the "highest and best bidder" language is incorporated in the Arizona Con-
stitution, so too is the Department's classification system, which should not
be ignored. 141
2. Interpreting the Dissent
Although the dissent did not completely remedy the "highest" use provi-
sion of the Enabling Act, its reasoning proves to be more effective and sup-
ported by law than the majority's. According to the dissent, the answer is
simple: if lands are in need of restoration, the Department has an obligation
to withdraw them from the lease pool. Allowing a third party to do the work
of the Department is against the duties owed to the state trust. In other
words, although there is no question as to whether the Commissioner has a
duty to accept the "highest and best" bid, the Commissioner also has a duty
136. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 369.
137. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-101(3),(7).
138. Id.
139. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 372.
140. Forest Guardians, 34 P.3d at 374 (Martone, J., dissenting).
141. Ariz. Const. art. 10 § 3.
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to withdraw lands that are in need of restoration.142 Withdrawing the lands
does not conflict with the Commissioner's fiduciary duty because it is in the
best interest of the state trust to withdraw the lands if they are in need of
restoration.
3. Beyond the Court's Reasoning
In addition to the dissent's opinion, the Department could have under-
gone further analysis of the meaning of "highest and best." The majority
considered only short-term financial gains in considering whether the bids
were in the best interest of the trust. As mentioned, the "best" bid presents a
question of law and fact. 143 Although the Department is required to maxi-
mize financial returns on state trust lands, "the 'best interest' standard does
not require blind adherence."' 44 The court has allowed other factors to be
considered in determining the "best" bidder, including long range concerns
regarding the use of land. 45 Here, the court did not take into account other
factors that might constitute the "best" bid. Policy implications alone
should put a lower grazing bid above a higher non-use bid because of the
potential long term effects of ousting grazers. Allowing non-grazers to lease
grazing land could significantly affect the grazing market. Fluctuations in
lease rates and bidding competition could cause some grazers to look else-
where to supplement their land holdings. In addition, some ranchers will go
out of business, as livestock grazing is one of the most popular land uses in
western North America. 146 Although the loss of cattle grazers in the state of
Arizona would not directly affect the state trust, a loss of bidders would.
With the decline in need by cattle grazers for state trust grazing lands, the
need by environmental organizations will also fall, causing a lack of finan-
cial gain from the trust lands. Grazing opponents that lease grazing lands
desire to put an end to public land grazing. If there is no potential for graz-
ing on a piece of state trust property, the environmental organizations will
withdraw their bids and the Department will be faced with financial losses
for the state schools. These long-term considerations should have been con-
sidered by the court in Forest Guardians to ensure the lands would be sub-
jected to the "best" use for the state trust.
Although the Department can increase its temporary revenue by award-
ing non-use leases to Plaintiffs, the court opened the Department to unclear
and potentially difficult decisions by simplifying the Department's fiduci-
ary duty. In addition to the policy implications, when the highest bid is to
be accepted, regardless of proposed use, the classification system becomes
142. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-132(A)(11).
143. Jeffries, 3 P.3d at 1074.
144. Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp., 807 P.2d at 1127.
145. Id.
146. Thomas L. Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North America, 8
Conservation Biology 629 (Sept. 1994).
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meaningless. Although the majority identifies non-use as a grazing compo-
nent, the dissent correctly concludes that non-use is only a grazing element
when it is accompanied by grazing in some form. If land uses overlap in the
classification system, it creates a potential slippery slope for the state legis-
lature and courts. Bidders may try to beat the system by obtaining grazing
land for uses normally deemed to be commercial or agricultural. While non-
use is not beyond the scope of grazing, a loose interpretation of non-use
may provide a forum for non-grazing advocates to remove grazing from
public land, which is certainly against the interest of the state trust.
B. The Arizona Preserve Initiative as a Conservation Tool
Both the majority and the dissent neglected to discuss the implications of
the Arizona Preserve Initiative. 147 Passed in 1996, the Initiative allows for
the selection of state trust land parcels, including former grazing lands, to
be reclassified for conservation uses. These lands must be within designated
areas and close to urban regions in Arizona. The Arizona Preserve Initiative
expressly provides an avenue for conservationists desiring to restore state
trust grazing land. Citizens and organizations can nominate areas they feel
are in need of restoration and, once the reclassification is complete, bid on
the land for conservation purposes. Regardless of whether the lands in this
case were within the designated areas, the Arizona Preserve Initiative pro-
vides a lawful and effective tool for conservationists.
Instead of circumventing statutory law to apply for grazing leases, con-
servation organizations should embrace the Arizona Preserve Initiative as
the legal remedy for over-grazed state trust land. Under the Initiative, the
state trust still benefits financially, and conservation groups can ensure de-
graded land is improved. In addition, because there is no limit to the
amount of land that can be nominated, 148 the Arizona Preserve Initiative
provides conservation groups more certainty than a bidding war can pro-
vide.
Interestingly, the Arizona Preserve Initiative creates a new classification
of state trust land.' 49 The court in Forest Guardians evaded the classifica-
tion system and held that the Commissioner's fiduciary duty is foremost in
the Department's consideration of bids. Under the Majority's reasoning, a
grazing operator could be the highest bidder for lands designated for con-
servation use and win a conservation lease because it was in the trust's best
financial interest.
147. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-312.
148. See Id.
149. Id.
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C. Additional Long-Term Effects
In addition to causing severe financial setbacks for the state's schools,
the Forest Guardians decision will likely invite negative ecological conse-
quences. While grazing is a natural component of ecosystems, there is little
argument that overgrazing is detrimental to landscapes, wildlife, and other
resources. 50 However, the private lands tied to these public grazing permits
provide critical habitat for endangered species. Private lands provide habitat
for about 75% of the nation's endangered species 5' and comprise half of
the Rocky Mountain West. 5 2 In addition, western private lands are more
productive than their public counterparts. 53 The prevention of future public
land grazing by third parties may encourage or force the sale of private
lands tied to public land grazing permits. As mentioned, grazing operators
could go out of business or experience financial setbacks from a lack of
rangeland to sustain their cattle operations. This phenomenon could negate
the efforts of conservation organizations by creating fragmentation of valu-
able private wildlife habitat through the sale and subsequent parcelization
of large private landholdings. In other words, cattle grazers who cease op-
erations will likely sell off parcels of their private land for exurban devel-
opment, one of the foremost open land uses in the West. 154
Because the West is currently experiencing some of the fastest popula-
tion growth in the nation, 55 understanding the effects of parcelization and
fragmentation in this area is paramount. Instead of moving into already
urban areas, the people in the West are flooding to exurban areas and creat-
ing fragmented "ranchettes," numerous golf courses, and expansive residen-
tial developments. This conversion of open private grazing land to exurban
developments to support the growing population of the West will likely
have a more detrimental effect on native biodiversity than large-scale
ranching operations. 156 Ranches sustain better native plant and faunal bio-
diversity than areas of exurban development, while exurban developments
favor nonnative and human-adapted species.1 57
Although the majority does not require the Department to accept Plain-
tiffs' bids, they do require it to place fiduciary duty foremost in the selec-
tion process. While the short term financial benefits are clear, the majority
150. Debra L. Donahue, supra n. 9, at 118.
151. J. A. Lockwood, The Intent and Implementation of the Endangered Species Act: A Matter of
Scale, in Private Property and the Endangered Species Act 73 (J. F. Shogren, ed., University of Texas
Press 1998).
152. Maestas, Knight & Gilbert, supra n. 1, at 510.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See W. E. Riebsame. Ranching a Changing Landscape: Development, Perception, and the
Political Ecology of the Western Range, in Writers on the Range: Western Writers Exploring the Chang-
ing Face of the American West (K. Hess and J. Baden, eds., University of Colorado Press, 1998).
156. See Maestas, Knight & Gilbert, supra n. 1.
157. Id. at 514.
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failed to consider the long term effects of their decision. The state trust's
financial and ecological status could suffer if conservation organizations
successfully bid for grazing permits. Thus, awarding leases to the highest
bidder, regardless of their intentions, is not in the best interest of the state
trust.
D. Conclusion
Forest Guardians represents a shift in public land grazing litigation. Al-
though the decision held the Department only has to consider each bid, re-
gardless of use, this case represents a slippery slope for the management of
state trust lands. Arizona has a great history of managing its state trust lands
for the benefit of schools. 58 While other states have squandered their lands
away over the past 100 years, Arizona has managed to create a system of
leases, sales, and management that provides financial compensation for the
state schools.159 As a result, Arizona should avoid far-reaching decisions
that change the face of state trust land management. This is especially true
when prior law suggests contrary conclusions. This paper is not meant to be
pro-grazing rhetoric, and there is no doubt something should be done to
improve grazing practices on public and private lands. However, acting
contrary to law and changing a system of land management that has lasted
for almost 100 years is not the answer.' 6° Not only does Forest Guardians
fail to comply with available constitutional and statutory law, but states
should look to less invasive solutions before revamping their state trust land
policies. Otherwise, both the schools and the landscape will suffer.
158. See generally Souder & Fairfax, supra n. 7.
159. Id.
160. Interestingly, Arizona's Legislature acted swiftly in response to Forest Guardians and
amended the statutory law to negate its effect. Any new lessee must now compensate the former lessee
for any non-removable improvements made to the land. The effect of this amendment will be to drasti-
cally reduce bidding by conservation organizations because the cost of non-removable improvements
such as fences is often too expensive for most non-profit conservation groups. David Kader et al., The
Arizona Supreme Court: Its 2001-2002 Decisions, 35 Arizona State L. J. 311, 341 (Summer 2003).
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